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Abstract 
 
This paper presents empirical evidence about the ability of event studies to 
capture mergers’ ex-post profitability as measured by accounting data. We use a 
sample of large horizontal concentrations during the period 1990-2002 
involving 482 firms either as merging firms or competitors, and contrast a 
measure of the mergers’ profitability based on stock market event studies with 
one based on balance sheet profit data. We show that using a long window 
around the announcement date (25 or 50 days before the event) increases the 
ability to capture the ex-post merger effect: the pairwise correlation coefficient 
is positive and highly significant. 
 
 
Keywords: Mergers, Merger Control, Event Studies, Ex-post Evaluation 
 
JEL Codes: L4, K21, G34 
                                                 
♣
 Acknowledgments: Tomaso Duso gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB/TR 15. Klaus Gugler and Burcin B. Yurtoglu acknowledge financial 
support from the OeNB through project 11782. 
∗
 Corresponding author: Tomaso Duso, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), Reichpietschufer 50, D-
10785 Berlin, Germany. Tel: +49 30 25491 403, Fax: +49 30 25491 444. E-Mail: duso@wzb.eu. 
 1
1. Introduction 
The empirical assessment of merger effects has a deep-rooted tradition in the industrial 
organization, corporate governance, and finance literature. Scholars have long been 
interested in understanding the driving forces of this phenomenon as well as how it affects 
the functioning of corporations and markets.1 Additionally, the competitive assessment of 
mergers has a fundamental policy dimension, since merger control has become one of the 
central tasks for anti-trust authorities worldwide. Yet, the most appropriate empirical 
approach to achieving such an assessment has been an open and debated issue for decades. 
Stock market reactions to merger announcements could help to predict mergers’ 
future profitability if financial markets are efficient. This approach, called the event study 
methodology, was developed in finance in the 1970s and is broadly accepted in this 
discipline, notwithstanding its limitations and some caveats on its applicability. Yet, many 
economists – in particular industrial organization economists – are skeptical about the 
presumptions of efficient markets and the financial market’s ability to correctly anticipate 
the competitive effects of mergers.2 Thus, the pioneering efforts of Eckbo (1983) to use this 
methodology in the antitrust analysis of mergers have not since been widely applied.3 
 A second approach, based on accounting data, has been advanced in the literature to 
measure merger effects. Following the pioneering work by Dennis Mueller (1980), several 
studies during the two following decades have tried to assess mergers by comparing the 
performance of the merging firms with a control group of non-merging firms and using the 
                                                 
1
  See Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) and Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) for an in-depth discussion of 
the recent literature on mergers. 
2
 See Fama (1998) and Shiller (2003) for two opposite views on the efficient market hypothesis. 
3
 Duso, Neven, and Röller (2007) thoroughly discuss the pros and contras of the event study methodology, 
while Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2007) present an exhaustive discussion of the literature that has used event 
studies to assess antitrust enforcement. Recently, Aktas et al. (2007) also used this methodology to assess 
European merger control. 
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difference between pre- and post-merger profits.4  Yet, the intense debate following Fisher 
and McGowan (1983) reflects the profession’s skepticism of the use of accounting rates of 
return as a reliable measure of the economic rate of return and, thus, of a firm’s 
performance.5  In line with this skepticism, Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) argue that 
operating performance studies can also be problematic in assessing the changes in the 
profitability of parties to an M&A transaction. Caves (1989) points to conflicting results 
obtained from event studies and operating performance studies and tries to reconcile these 
two sets of empirical evidence. Hence, the central question arises as to whether these two 
approaches lead to significantly different conclusions. 
This paper builds on our previous extensive work6 and tries to answer this question 
by estimating (1) the (ex-ante) announcement effects of mergers on both merging and rival 
firms by means of an event study, (2) (ex-post) balance sheet profit effects of these mergers 
on merging and rival firms up to five years post-merger, and (3) by comparing these 
estimates by correlation and regression analysis.   
                                                 
4
 See Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) and Gugler et al. (2003) for the most recent and comprehensive study 
using this kind of approach. 
5
 Grout and Zalewska (2008) provide an extensive discussion of various measures of the rate of return and 
excessive returns and their use and applicability in competition law. In addition to this general concern, 
accounting for mergers and acquisitions as well as the use of different accounting rules across countries has also 
been one of the most controversial financial reporting issues, generating numerous and divergent opinions and 
interpretations (Aboody et al. 2000). While we see that arbitrary reporting practices would pose a serious 
limitation to the validity of any paper using accounting data, we believe that systematic differences across 
countries are less of a concern in our research design, which compares merging and rival firms’ profits to firms 
in the same industry and correlates these with ex-ante measures of a firm’s profitability. Unless firms change 
their reporting systems in unpredictable ways, our methodology will not be subject to a systematic bias caused 
by different accounting rules in different countries. This is also supported by the results of the various 
robustness checks based on different counterfactuals, such as similar size or geographical regions, but none 
changed our results significantly. 
6
  See Gugler et al. (2003) for an in-depth study of mergers’ effects using accounting data and Duso, Neven, and 
Röller, (2007) and Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2006) and (2007) for an analysis of merger effects based on 
event studies. 
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Our results indicate that the market seems to correctly anticipate the profit effects 
when we use long windows spanning 25 or 50 days before the announcement date, as 
indicated by a positive and significant correlation between the two measures. On the 
contrary, it seems that short windows might not be able to predict rivals’ profits, as the 
correlation between abnormal returns and ex-post excess profits is, in some cases, even 
negative and significant. Notice at this point that our analysis does not imply a judgment on 
what the “right” measure of merger performance is, we just point out under which 
circumstances measures based on different techniques and data sources lead to similar 
results, thus enhancing our confidence that, in those cases, both measures might capture the 
merger’s true effect.  
Given the inconclusive nature of the debate mentioned above, our results have 
potentially important policy implications. If ex-ante and ex-post measures of profitability are 
strongly correlated, then event studies might be used to provide supporting (yet surely not 
conclusive) evidence in the competitive assessment of mergers. Recent interest by the 
competition authorities (Beverley, 2007) suggests that even practitioners consider this link to 
be an important one. 
A number of other studies have tried to compare ex-ante previsions through event 
studies with ex-post realizations. Using different samples of mergers, Ravenscraft and 
Pascoe (1989), Healy et al. (1992), Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), Schwert (1996), as well as 
Sirower and O’Byrne (1998) show that ex-ante stock market returns are positively and 
significantly correlated with ex-post performance. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, no 
study has attempted to measure the ability of an event study to infer a merger’s profitability 
effect for competitors, which is a novelty of our paper that has been made possible by a very 
unique dataset. 
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This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic ideas of the two 
methodologies to measure mergers’ effects; Section 3 describes the data and the correlations 
results; Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Measuring Profitability 
2.1. Event Studies 
This methodology is based on the fundamental idea that stock prices represent the 
discounted value of firms’ future stream of profits. Hence, when observing a stock market 
reaction to the announcement of a particular event (e.g. a merger), the change in the equity 
value of firms affected by this event (e.g. merging firms and their rivals) can then be taken as 
a measure of the (discounted) additional profits that they are expected to accrue as a 
consequence of the event. The main issue is then to identify the right counterfactual, i.e. 
what would have happened had this event not occurred. The idea of the event study 
methodology is to use a model – most commonly the market model – to predict this 
counterfactual. 
Under the assumption of efficient markets and rational expectations, the market 
model predicts that firm i’s stock return at time t ( itR ) is proportional to a market return 
( mtR ): 
itmtiiit RR εβα ++= ,     (1) 
where itε  is an i.i.d. normally distributed error term. 
To study the stock price reaction to the merger’s announcements, we first estimate 
the “normal return” for each firm by using (1) over 240 trading days, starting 60 days prior 
to the merger’s announcement date and using the Scholes-Williams (1977) method. We 
obtain estimated values for the model’s parameters αi and βi, which we use to generate the 
counterfactual, i.e. to predict what firm i’s stock price would have been had the merger not 
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been announced ( itRˆ ). For each firm i, we then calculate the abnormal return around the 
merger’s announcement day t (ARi,t) as: 
)ˆˆ(ˆ mtiiitititit RRRRAR βα +−=−= . 
Since there might be information leakages, which influenced firm i’s return before (or 
after) the merger announcement, we define the total firm valuation effect of the merger as 
being the sum of the daily abnormal return within an event window spanning from m days 
before the event to n days after it:7 
, , ,
n
i m n i
m
CAR AR
τ
τ
τ
=
=−
= ∑ . 
We calculate these measures for each of the merging and rival firms.  
Given that the aim of our paper is to analyze the ability of the event study 
methodology to infer the ex-post merger’s profitability effect, and because the merger’s ex-
post profit effects are generally expressed in millions of US dollars (see next section), we 
also decide to express our ex-ante profitability measures in terms of million US dollars. This 
is a common approach in the literature, which started with Malatesta (1983) and was 
followed by many other scholars (e.g. Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2005, or Mueller 
and Yurtoglu, 2007).8 We therefore generate the cumulative abnormal returns in terms of 
firms’ value (MV_CAR) by multiplying the CARs by the firms’ market values: 
nmiitnmi CARMVCARMV ,,,, *_ =  
where MVit is the market value for firm i in time t, and ),( nmt ∈ . 
                                                 
7
 The choice of the event window is a much debated issue. While a long window might help to capture 
important information leakages that affect firms’ returns, a shorter window helps to reduce the noise due to the 
occurrence of other non-merger-related events, which might also affect firms’ valuation. In the following 
analysis we will present the results obtained with different windows and discuss our choices. 
8
 It is worth mentioning that both Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) and Mueller and Yurtoglu (2007) 
report negative “cumulative abnormal value changes” either for the whole sample or parts of their samples, 
even though the corresponding “percentage abnormal change” is positive. 
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2.2. Ex-Post Profitability 
We use the methodology of Gugler et al. (2003) to predict a merger’s ex-post profit effects.9 
The method compares reported profit levels post-merger with predicted profit levels in the 
absence of the merger. Also in this case, the central issue is the creation of the right 
counterfactual. Our counterfactual is the development of profits and total assets of the 
median firm (in terms of profitability) in the same 3-digit industry (SIC3) as the merging 
firms or their rivals operate. We used a number of other counterfactuals, such as similar size 
or geographical regions, but none changed our results significantly. 
The projected change in the returns on the acquirer’s assets from year t-1 to t+n are 
defined as: 
1
1
,1,
−
−
+
+
+−
Π
−
Π
=∆
IGt
IGt
nIGt
nIGt
nttIG KK
, where ΠIGt+n are the median firm’s (income 
statement) profits and KIDt+n are the median firm’s assets both in the same 3-digit industry of 
the acquired company in year t+n. We define ∆ID,t-1,t+n for the acquired firm’s industry 
analogously to ∆IG,t-1,t+n. The predicted profits of the combined company M in year t+n is 
then: 10 
 1 1 1, 1 1 1,
1 1
IG t n ID t npredicted
G t G t IG t t n D t D t ID t t nMt n
IG t ID t
K K
K K
K K
+ +
− − − + − − − ++
− −
= + + +Π ∆ Π ∆Π , 
where ΠGt+n (ΠDt) are the profits and KGt+n (KDt) are the assets of the acquiring (acquired) 
company in year t+n (t). 11 
                                                 
9
 We refer to their paper for a more extensive discussion of the methodology. 
10
 The profits of the merged company in year t+n are predicted to be the profits of the acquirer in t-1, plus the 
predicted growth in its profits from t-1 to t+n, plus the profits of the acquired firm in t, plus the predicted 
growth in its profits from t to t+n in the absence of the merger. 
11
 As pointed out by Barber and Lyon (1996), when calculating accounting-based operating performance, it is 
important to condition on prior operating performance because operating performance might be mean reverting. 
While we do not attempt to directly correct our measures of accounting-based operating performance for mean 
reversion, we take this into account in the regression analysis that we present in Section 3. 
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The same logic can be applied to the rivals. In fact, antitrust markets are different 
from industries based on the SIC classification. The advantage of our database, which is 
thoroughly discussed in Duso, Neven, and Röller (2007), is that we have information on the 
merging firms’ effective rivals in the involved product markets.12 These firms are not a good 
counterfactual, since they are affected by the merger just as much as the merging firms are. 
However, the merger should not strongly impact on the rest of the industry, which makes the 
3-digit SIC classification a good counterfactual for the merger, once we exclude the merging 
and rival firms. We can subsequently get a measure of the projected change in the returns and 
of the predicted profit for the rivals in absence of the merger, which is something novel in the 
literature.  
Our measure of firm i's merger effect (i=merging entity or rivals) is then the 
difference between actual (observed) profits in year t+n and the predicted profits: 
 
predicted
nit
actual
nit
effect
nit +++ Π−Π=∆Π  
3. The Data and Correlations 
Our original sample consists of 167 large horizontal concentrations that were under antitrust 
scrutiny by the European Commission (EC) during the period 1990-2002.13 The definition of 
the merging firms and the competitors is made according to the Commission’s reports, 
which are freely downloadable from the Commission’s webpage. 
The use of these reports has the exceptional advantage that it allows us to exploit the 
carefully done market definition by the Commission’s officials and, hence, it enables a fairly 
                                                 
12
 The product market definition, hence the definition of effective competitors, is taken from the reports of the 
EU commission. All our mergers, in fact, were under antitrust scrutiny of the EU antitrust authority. In the data 
section we expand on this point. 
13
 Our sample – which was developed by Duso, Neven, and Röller (2007) - includes almost all problematic 
mergers that underwent an in-depth antitrust investigation (phase II) by the European Commission at the end of 
2001, and a randomly matched sample of less problematic cases cleared in the first investigation phase (phase 
I), which ran up to June 2002. See Duso, Neven, and Röller (2007) and Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2006) for a 
detailed description of the data and the European merger control regime. 
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precise assessment of the effective rivals to the merging entities. This is particularly useful 
since it also allows us to generate a counterfactual for the rivals, by using all other firms in 
the same SIC3 industry that have not been either merging firms or direct competitors in the 
product market. Indeed, while some firms in the same industry will certainly be rivals, other 
firms are likely to be customers and/or suppliers to the merging firms, and still others may 
have no relation to the merging parties. 
Clearly, drawing mergers from those transactions under antitrust scrutiny in Europe 
leads to European firms being over-proportionally represented in our sample. Yet, these 
transactions have a clear international dimension, since they very often affect not only 
European but also world markets. Indeed, our sample reflects this diversity as more than 
one-fourth of the involved firms are listed in either the US or Canada, and 15% come from 
the rest of the world. Therefore, we can consider our sample as being representative of the 
global environment for merger and acquisitions, even if it is clearly biased towards big 
European corporations. 
For all the identified firms, we first defined the merger’s announcement date by 
means of Dow Jones interactive, a customizable business news and research product that 
integrates content from newspapers, newswires, journals, research reports and web sites. We 
chose as the announcement date the first day where rumors about the merger appeared in the 
press.14 We then collected stock market data by using Datastream. We were able to identify 
544 different firms either as merging or as rival firms. Since some firms participated in 
several mergers either as merging entity or rivals, we indeed have 955 observations at the 
                                                 
14
 To check the reliability of this information, we made the extra effort of obtaining the announcement dates 
(“original data announced”) from the SDC database (Thomson Reuters) for a large subsample of our 167 
events.  A comparison of these two different data sources reveals a strong overlap: for most of the events the 
event dates coincide and for a small fraction of them the differences between the two event dates was minimal.  
Thus, we are fairly confident that the use of the DJI database does not introduce a systematic bias into our 
results.  
 9
firm level. Finally, we matched this data with balance sheet data from the Global 
Vantage/Compustat databases. Due to missing data for relevant variables and the inability to 
match firm names, the number of observations was substantially reduced to 596. 
In order to have a comparable sample, we have kept only those firms for which we 
were able to predict the ex-post profit effects at least two years after the merger. Hence, the 
final sample consists of 114 mergers involving 155 merging firms (85 acquirers and 70 
targets) and 327 rivals. Since we are only interested in comparing the two profitability 
measures for each single entity, this sample selection is not a major concern. Moreover, the 
firms in our sample tend to be the larger ones and the mergers that remain are the big 
transactions that make it in the press. Precisely for these mergers, it would be useful to 
understand how reliable the two profitability measures are, since these are generally the 
most problematic ones from an antitrust policy perspective.  
Table 1 reports the means, medians and standard deviations for the MV_CARs based 
on different event windows,15 while table 2 reports the profitability effects (
,
effect
i t n+∆Π ) for 
merging firms and rivals up to five years after the merger.16  Some similarities and some 
differences between the results obtained with the two methodologies already appear from 
these aggregate statistics. For the merging firms, the means of the MV_CARs are negative 
                                                 
15
 For the short window (5 days), we based our choice on a standard practice in the literature (e.g. Andrade, 
Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001). Results with an even shorter window (3 days) are very similar. For the long 
windows, we were guided by the peculiarity of our sample. We discussed this issue in depth on a companion 
paper (see Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu, 2006 p. 20 and Figure 3) where we show the existence of an average 
upward drift of abnormal returns beginning some 50 days before the announcement of the merger for merging 
firms and rivals. 
16
 If we express the MV_CARs reported in table 1 in percentage terms (CARs), we obtain the following picture: 
targets wrap most of the benefits of the merger with positive and significant abnormal returns in the range 
between +3.6% and +5%, depending on the window. Acquirers at best break even with positive but not 
significant abnormal returns ranging between 0% and +0.7%, depending on the window. The overall effect for 
merging firms is positive and partially significant (between 0.1% and 0.96%) and it is positive and significant 
for the rivals (between 0.3% and 1.1%). These results are very much comparable with those reported in the 
literature (e.g., Campa and Hernando, 2004; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; and Atkas et al. 2007). 
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while the means of the profit effects are positive. However, both the median MV_CARs and 
the median ex-post effect are positive. In general, the differences between MV_CARs and 
ex-post profit effects seem substantial: Clearly, the MV_CARs underestimate on average the 
ex-post profit effects of the merger. Finally, the variability of the measures based on stock 
data is much higher as witnessed by the larger standard deviation.  
 Looking at rivals, the picture is quite different. In this case, both the means and the 
medians of the MV_CARs (with the possible exception of MV_CAR (2,2), which is close to 
zero) have the same positive sign as the ex-post profit measures. Also, the magnitudes of the 
average effects obtained with stock market data and accounting data are quite comparable, 
while the median MV_CARs again seem to underestimate the median ex-post profit effects.  
 Up until now, we have discussed the aggregate picture, yet we are much more 
interested in comparing, for each firm, how close the results obtained with the two 
methodologies are. We therefore perform a pairwise correlation analysis, which is reported 
in table 3.17 For merging firms, the correlation coefficients between MV_CAR(50,5) and 
merger profit effects are always positive and mostly significant. Moreover, the profit effects 
four years after the merger seem to be very well captured by all measures of abnormal 
returns. Yet, MV_CARs based on long windows seem to perform better in terms of 
correlation with accounting-based operating performance measures. The picture is similar, 
or even reinforced, for rivals: MV_CARs based on short windows produce very misleading 
results, since they are negatively and significantly correlated to the profit effects. Again, for 
                                                 
17
 Whether both variables of interest (MV_CAR and 
,
effect
i t n+∆Π ) are measured in millions of US dollars or 
expressed in percentage terms (in the case of CARs, as a fraction of the market value and, in the case of 
profitability, as a fraction of firm size such as total assets) does not lead to qualitatively different results for the 
correlation analysis.  
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rivals the MV_CARs based on long windows (30 or 55 days) also seem to capture well the 
long-term merger profit effects.18  
 The next step of our analysis consists of looking at whether there are differences in 
the financial markets response for pro- or anti-competitive mergers in terms of ability to 
predict the post-merger profitability performance. Accordingly, we partition the sample 
following Duso, Neven, and Röller (2007). We define a merger as anti-competitive if the 
post-merger rivals’ profitability – as measured by the weighted sum of the MV_CARs of all 
rivals for each merger in the (25,5) window – increases.19  Table 4 reports the results for the 
two samples of pro- and anti-competitive mergers. Interestingly, the market correctly 
anticipates anti-competitive mergers when using long pre-announcement periods (25 to 50 
days), as witnessed by the large and significant correlation coefficients for rivals up to five 
years post merger. Also, the market predicts merging firms’ rents stemming from increased 
efficiencies (pro-competitive mergers) more precisely than those stemming from an increase 
in market power (anti-competitive mergers). 
 Finally, we look at whether the found correlations are robust to the use of regression 
analysis, especially with the aim of correcting for possible mean reversion of profits (see 
Barber and Lyon, 1996). Table 5 presents regressions of the MV_CARs for various event 
windows on profit effects of the merger five years after the deals ( effectti 5, +∆Π ) and profits of the 
firms lagged by one period ( 1, −Π ti  ). All variables are in million US dollars. Notice that the 
causality runs from the profit effects to the MV_CARs: assuming efficient capital markets, 
                                                 
18
 Similar results in terms of sign and significance can be obtained restricting the sample to those mergers for 
which we have non-missing observations also for the profitability effects up to 5 years after the merger. 
19
 The argument was initially put forward by Eckbo (1983). While post-merger profit increases for the merging 
firms can be due to two effects – the market power effect but also desirable efficiency gains – profit increases of 
rival firms unambiguously must result from the post-merger increase in market power. Duso, Neven, and Röller 
(2007) provide a formal derivation of the correspondence between an increase in rivals’ profit and a decrease in 
consumers’ surplus. 
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the market should anticipate the subsequent profit effects of the mergers and, accordingly, 
change the current stock price. One period-lagged-profits is included to control for its 
possible mean reversion.20 
For merging firms, all coefficients on effectti 5, +∆Π  are positive, however none are 
significant. Mean reversion in profits does not appear to materially impact our results, since 
only one coefficient is significant at the 10% level (see the regression for MV_CAR(50,5) 
and pro-competitive mergers). 
As previously seen in the correlation analysis, the most significant results are 
obtained for rivals and, in particular, in anti-competitive mergers. The coefficient using 
MV_CAR(50,5), the longest window, is 1.05 and significant at the 1% level. For these 
mergers, every million US dollars in subsequent profit effects over five years is translated 
into an equivalent amount of market value now. Again, mean reversion of profits does not 
appear to materially impact our results, since only one coefficient is negative and significant 
(again for pro-competitive mergers for MV_CAR(25,5)). 
To sum up, the results using regression analysis are consistent with the results using 
correlation coefficients. In particular, an event study of stock returns best uncovers anti-
competitive effects due to a merger when looking at appropriately defined rivals and using a 
reasonably long window before the merger – in our case, 50 days. 
 
                                                 
20
 The literature that tries to explain the size of the abnormal returns suggests the use of some firm-specific – 
e.g. size – and transaction-specific – e.g. form of payment – control variables. Indeed, several empirical studies 
provide evidence (see the survey by Mueller, 2003) that post-merger cumulative returns are lower for mergers 
and acquisitions financed through exchanges of shares than for those financed with cash. It is, however, worth 
mentioning that our point is to provide evidence of the correlation between two measures of profitability: one 
ex-ante based on stock price data and one ex-post based on balance sheet data.  While the use of such controls 
could potentially allow us to analyze different dimensions of heterogeneity in our sample, it is very likely that 
these factors influence both abnormal returns and profit effects in the same direction and hence do not bias our 
results in Tables 4 and 5. 
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4. Conclusions  
The assessment of the competitive effects of large mergers is one of the pillars of anti-trust 
policy worldwide and has, therefore, a very important policy dimension. Unfortunately, 
these effects are not observed at the time when the authority is making its decision to allow 
or block the merger, or to let the merger through with remedies.  
 In this paper we review the two main methodologies used in the literature during the 
last 30 years to assess merger effects. The first methodology is based on the stock market 
reactions to the merger announcement and it represents an ex-ante analysis, which could in 
principle help to predict the future profitability, since financial markets are supposed to be 
forward-looking. The second methodology is based on accounting data and it embodies an 
ex-post assessment. The development in profits of the involved firms several years after the 
merger is compared to that of a counterfactual, which is defined to be the median firm in the 
same SIC3 industry. 
We apply these two methodologies to a sample of big mergers that underwent the 
antitrust scrutiny of the European Commission in the period 1990-2001. These are the big 
transactions, which significantly affect the functioning of product markets and, therefore, are 
particularly relevant from the antitrust policy perspective. Unlike the previous literature, we 
can also assess the merger effects for rival firms, by exploiting the careful market definition 
made by the Commission’s experts to have an accurate characterization of the merging 
firms’ effective competitors in the product market. 
We establish empirical evidence that the event study methodology might be useful 
for the ex-ante competitive analysis of mergers. In particular, we show that abnormal returns 
and the ex-post profitability of mergers are positively and significantly correlated for 
merging firms and, partially, also for their competitors. This is particularly true when using 
long pre-announcement event windows. Moreover, the event study methodology seems to be 
particularly useful for identifying and measuring the rivals’ post-merger profits stemming 
 14
from anti-competitive rents and the merging firms’ post-merger profits stemming from 
enhanced efficiency. 
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Table 1: Preliminary Statistics - Abnormal Returns 
 
 
MV_CAR(2,2) MV_CAR(5,5) MV_CAR(25,5) MV_CAR(50,5) 
 
ACQUIRERS 
Mean -185.566 -439.573   -68.127  -412.514 
Median 1.858 0.142 9.085  52.108 
St. Dev. 1289.897 2104.995 2616.232 3743.657 
Obs. 84 84 84 84 
 
TARGETS 
Mean 66.55704 67.614 104.041 82.797 
Median 13.02516 14.399 12.505 42.388 
St. Dev. 1367.39 1597.184 3058.679 3133.289 
Obs. 70 70 70 70 
 
MERGING FIRMS 
Mean -68.752   -192.601 -86.019 -165.981 
Median 9.229 11.7179 2.359 29.742 
St. Dev. 1293.746 1545.192 2912.732 3467.705 
Obs. 114 114 114 114 
 
RIVALS 
Mean 27.581 27.103   35.571 141.600 
Median -0.571 6.373 5.666 4.528 
St. Dev. 944.624 1433.983 2315.953 2913.687 
Obs. 327 327 327 327 
Notes: All values are expressed in Million US$. The MV_CAR(m,n) variables represent the 
cumulative abnormal returns in terms of market value over the window spanning from m days 
before the event to n days after the event. 
 
Table 2: Preliminary Statistics - Profit Effects 
 
 
, 1
effect
M t+∆Π  , 2
effect
M t+∆Π  , 3
effect
M t+∆Π  , 4
effect
M t+∆Π  , 5
effect
M t+∆Π  
 
MERGING FIRMS 
Mean -165.981 159.908 204.547 454.1948   467.3696 
Median 62.260 103.521 108.986 203.217 202.620 
St. Dev. 3467.705 2170.974 1545.483 1891.783  944.4786 
Obs. 132 132 101 86 66 
 RIVALS 
Mean 141.6003 31.88484 203.1284 334.7082    422.7895 
Median 69.256 53.328 74.230 103.467 242.653 
St. Dev. 2913.687 2564.891 1754.104 1669.766   1284.532 
Obs. 327 327 221 174 143 
Notes: All values are expressed in Million US$. The 
,
effect
i t n+∆Π  variables represent the aggregated 
profit change from one year before the merger to n years after the merger if compared to the 
median firm in the same SIC3 industry.  
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Table 3: Pair wise Correlations: All Mergers 
 MERGING FIRMS RIVALS 
 
MV_CAR(2,2) MV_CAR(5,5) MV_CAR(25,5) MV_CAR(50,5) MV_CAR(2,2) MV_CAR(5,5) MV_CAR(25,5) MV_CAR(50,5) 
, 1
effect
i t+∆Π  0.0144 -0.0357 0.1274 0.1643 0.0953 -0.0662 0.0690 0.1648 
 
0.8598 0.6599 0.1131 0.0411** 0.0571** 0.1878 0.1703 0.0010*** 
, 2
effect
i t+∆Π  0.1281 -0.0537 0.1289 0.2031 -0.1488 -0.0752 -0.0133 0.0611 
 
0.1546 0.5519 0.1488 0.0225** 0.0082*** 0.1855 0.8150 0.2814 
, 3
effect
i t+∆Π  0.0013 0.0210 0.2022 0.2096 0.0024 -0.0983 0.0856 0.0617 
 
0.9900 0.8375 0.0448 0.0373** 0.9715 0.1462 0.2057 0.3647 
, 4
effect
i t+∆Π  0.5408 0.0966 0.1601 0.4778 -0.1556 -0.0462 0.1802 0.1818 
 0.0000*** 0.3848 0.1459 0.0000*** 0.0415** 0.5474 0.0180** 0.2862 
, 5
effect
i t+∆Π  0.2882 0.1894 0.1444 0.2926 -0.1770 0.0615 0.4556 0.1837 
 0.0199** 0.1309 0.2511 0.4630 0.0364** 0.4704 0.0000*** 0.0298** 
Notes: We report pair wise correlation coefficients (first row) as well as p-values (second row).***, **, * 
represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 4: Pairwise Correlations: Mergers Split into Pro and Anticompetitive 
 
Notes: We report pair wise correlation coefficients (first row) as well as p-values (second row).***, **, * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. A merger is defined to be anticompetitive (procompetitive) if 
the aggregated cumulative abnormal returns of the rivals - MV_CAR(25,5) - are positive (negative). The sample 
includes all observations for which the variable 
, 2
effect
i t+∆Π was not missing.  
 
MERGING FIRMS 
 
PROCOMPETITIVE ANTICOMPETITIVE 
 
MV_CAR(2,2) MV_CAR(5,5) MV_CAR(25,5) MV_CAR(50,5) MV_CAR(2,2) MV_CAR(5,5) MV_CAR(25,5) MV_CAR(50,5) 
, 1
effect
i t+∆Π  
 0.0434  0.0355  0.1252  0.1732 -0.0254 -0.1132  0.1601  0.1697 
 0.7135  0.7639  0.2810  0.1401  0.8243  0.3175  0.1560  0.1299 
, 2
effect
i t+∆Π  
 0.2716  0.0655  0.1669  0.3442  0.0042 -0.1626  0.1104  0.1115 
 0.0286**  0.6040  0.1771  0.0050  0.9748  0.2145  0.4012  0.3925 
, 3
effect
i t+∆Π  
-0.0331 -0.0486  0.2177  0.1635  0.0688  0.1085  0.1993 
 0.2492 
 0.8175  0.7350  0.1211  0.2517  0.6461  0.4679  0.1793 
 0.0877* 
, 4
effect
i t+∆Π  
 0.8112  0.2547  0.2667  0.8304 -0.0637 -0.0456  0.0777  0.0818 
 0.0000***  0.0840*  0.0669*  0.0000***  0.7123  0.7918  0.6526  0.6304 
, 5
effect
i t+∆Π  
 0.3361  0.2278 -0.0360 -0.0512  0.2903  0.1427  0.2360  0.1708 
 0.0484**  0.1882  0.8374  0.7702  0.1197  0.4518  0.2094  0.3668 
 
RIVALS 
 
PROCOMPETITIVE ANTICOMPETITIVE 
 
MV_CAR(2,2) MV_CAR(5,5) MV_CAR(25,5) MV_CAR(50,5) MV_CAR(2,2) MV_CAR(5,5) MV_CAR(25,5) MV_CAR(50,5) 
, 1
effect
i t+∆Π  
 0.3314  0.0204  0.0085  0.1264 -0.1174 -0.1455  0.1444  0.2191 
 0.0000***  0.7842  0.9090  0.0899  0.0860*  0.0334**  0.0348**  0.0013*** 
, 2
effect
i t+∆Π  
-0.1222  0.0271 -0.2188 -0.0413 -0.2211 -0.2676  0.3003  0.2045 
 0.1262  0.7365 
 0.0059***  0.6077  0.0055***  0.0008***  0.0002***  0.0104*** 
, 3
effect
i t+∆Π  
 0.1216 -0.1338  0.0062  0.0402 -0.1353  0.0004 
 0.2199  0.1600 
 0.1953  0.1541  0.9478  0.6724  0.1687  0.9971 
 0.0242**  0.1029 
, 4
effect
i t+∆Π  
-0.2841 -0.2379 -0.0742 -0.0837 -0.0598  0.1817  0.4032  0.1853 
 0.0055*  0.0210**  0.4770  0.4227  0.6029  0.1113  0.0003***  0.1043 
, 5
effect
i t+∆Π  
-0.0355 
 0.3037  0.1482 -0.0266 -0.4058 -0.3331  0.6128  0.2933 
 0.7656 
 0.0090***  0.2108  0.8234  0.0007***  0.0059***  0.0000***  0.0160** 
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Table 5: Regression results 
 Merging firms 
Dep. Vars:  MV_CAR (5,5) MV_CAR (25,5) MV_CAR (50,5) 
Sample Var Coeff t-value Coeff t-value Coeff t-value 
All , 5effecti t+∆Π  
 0.16  0.82  0.21  0.69  0.45  0.76 
 , 1i t−Π  
-0.14 -0.69 -0.10 -0.19 -0.67 -0.81 
Procomp , 5effecti t+∆Π  
 0.31  1.02  0.16  0.44  0.32  0.59 
 , 1i t−Π  -0.22 -0.63 -0.61 -1.25 -0.99 * -1.81 
Anticomp , 5effecti t+∆Π  
 0.04  0.17  0.59  0.99  0.80  0.67 
 , 1i t−Π  -0.16 -0.64  0.23  0.26 -0.41 -0.30 
 Rivals 
Dep. Vars:  MV_CAR (5,5) MV_CAR (25,5) MV_CAR (50,5) 
Sample Var Coeff t-value Coeff t-value Coeff t-value 
All , 5effecti t+∆Π  
 0.02  0.34  0.14  1.31 
 0.71 ***  3.41 
 , 1i t−Π  -0.01 -0.12 -0.08 -0.76 -0.13 -0.55 
Procomp , 5effecti t+∆Π  
 0.11  1.59 
 0.21 ***  2.55  0.03  0.07 
 , 1i t−Π  
-0.03 -0.45 -0.43 *** -3.77 -0.41 -1.52 
Anticomp , 5effecti t+∆Π  
-0.09 -1.36 
 0.15 *  1.77  1.05 ***  3.09 
 , 1i t−Π  
 0.06  1.01  0.18 **  2.06 -0.06 -0.15 
Notes: We report the coefficients and t-values of regressions with MV_CARs in Mn. USD (various 
windows) as dependent variables and projected profit effects after five years ( effect
ti 5, +∆Π ), and lagged 
profits ( 1, −Π ti ) (both in Mn. USD) as explanatory variables for the subsamples listed in the table. The 
symbols ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. A merger is defined 
to be anticompetitive (procompetitive) if the aggregated cumulative abnormal returns of the rivals - 
MV_CAR(25,5) - are positive (negative).  
 
 
